When presented with the questions of why we obey the law, or what one would do when faced with a law that they felt was wrong or unjust, we become forced to consider the seemingly complex relationship between law and morality. In acknowledgement of such a notion stands legal theory and its varying conceptions regarding where law derives its authority. Consensus on the matter proves rather illusive, producing numerous legal theories, differing from each other with respect to the role of morality in determining the validity of legal norms. Legal positivism represents a mindset perhaps best described by John Gardner, who states "whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits  (203). As such, positivists acknowledge that laws may be unjust, but these laws do not lose or gain legal validity as a mode of social ordering simply because they are deemed morally desirable or undesirable. Natural law theory opposes the positivistic approach, contending that the validity of laws derives, at least in part, from considerations having to do with the moral content of those laws (Dyzenhaus, Moreau, and Ripstein 6). The relevance of these debates is illustrated in the case Mack v Attorney General of Canada, which brings to light the possibility of reaching opposing conclusions on a single matter by employing either rationale of legal theory. Between 1885-1903, the government of Canada imposed a tax of $50, which rose to $500, followed by the "Exclusion Act  in 1923, which severely prohibited Chinese immigration with very few exceptions (Dyzenhaus, Moreau, and Ripstein 204). The enacted legislation (head tax laws) served as an explicitly racist means to dissuade Chinese immigration, which was perceived as a plague to the Canadian economy. Moreover, existing members of the Chinese community, even those born in Canada, were disenfranchised and denied Canadian citizenship. It was not until 1947 that the Exclusion Act was repealed, however in the decades that followed the government of Canada failed to provide members of the Chinese Canadian community with any type of redress. Consequently, members of the Chinese Canadian community who had actually paid the tax, or their spouses or descendants brought a class action forth in Mack v Attorney General of Canada. The circumstances surrounding the case were heard first by the Superior Court of Justice and later by the Ontario Court of Appeal, where both courts affirmed the attorney generals motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claim lacked a sufficient cause for action (Dyzenhaus, Moreau, and Ripstein 205). The central claim of the plaintiffs was that the federal government had been unjustly enriched by the head tax. However, it is well established that an enrichment supported by a valid statute will not typically count as unjust. The head tax laws provided the requisite juristic reason for their validity (Dyzenhaus, Moreau, and Ripstein 216). In opposition to this legal principle, stood the fact most indispensable to the arguments