The main question aimed to answer here is precisely if cinema is indeed a world of its own. Apparently simple, this question comprehends a wide range of aspects and specifities not only related to cinema but also to previous visual devices such as photography. Throughout the analysis of arguments, some opposing, some backing up the concept of cinema as a second world (Frampton, 2006: 1), other relevant issues will arise such as the way in which is possible for us to engage with film if we consider that it represents a world other than our own. In order to answer to the proposed question, one must first understand cinema as a technical visual device, perhaps one of the most effective when considering its capability of affecting individuals and society in general. When cinema appeared, and as noted by Crary (1988), it founded a new paradigm in the visual culture by causing a rupture with all the previous optical devices: cinema does not try to mirror any pre-existing reality; instead, cinema produces a new reality where its own realism, truth and objectivity are put to work. However, in the beginning of the 19th century there was still who believed that film promised the registration of pure materiality sans subjective intervention (Dasgrupta in Colman, 2009: 340), a expectation previously placed upon photography. Rancire eliminated this expectation by affirming that if the eye of the camera wants nothing, as previously stated by Epstein, that why it is made to want something by the film-maker" (Rancire quoted in Dasgrupta, 2009: 340). This equally represents a turning point caused by cinema as it, contrarly to photography and even to the perspetive technique in painting, never denied its subjetive dimension, going even further by re-incorporating the human vision and accepting that the production of images is unavoidably connected with the establishment of points of view. In order to understand whether film is a reflection of reality or a distorted mirror of that same reality (Frampton, 2006: 3) one must analyse the not so short path of film production. In the analysis Baudry and Williams (1974) made about how the technical cinematographic apparatus can be used to conceal the ideological contents in film, they establish the moments in which that same apparatus intervenes in the film production. The authors recognised two key moments in which an instrumental base intervenes during film production: the first, identified as decoupage, happens between objective reality and the camera, consisting in the breakdown of the scenes which will be shot; the second moment happens between the inscription [in the camera] and the projection, in a process which is commonly known as post-production (1974: 40). The camera is here understood as an instrument which occupies an intermediate position, not undermining it as the operator of a key mutation of the signifying material (1974: 40). All these stages are considered by the authors to be part of the cinematographic specificity, which they assume, consists in transmuting the objective reality into the film itself. That transfiguration further includes the dynamization of space and, accordingly, spatialization of time (Panofsky in Cohen and Mast, 1974: 154) meaning that a film is capable of portrayi