The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with global aspirations in political and economic domain in last two decades is an area of concern for the United States, a number of China's neighbors in the Asia-Pacific and South Asia region. These concerns are heightened by a closed political system and culture of secrecy, which places many aspects of Chinese military capabilities and national security decision-making processes off-limits. Even relatively innocuous information about military capabilities is often protected, classified, or censored by the government. Public debates about defense issues are rare, and often rely on Western estimates of Chinese military capabilities because official information is not available from government sources. All these concerns together give rise to a perfect scenario of security dilemma; where one country's efforts to make itself more secure can decrease the security of others. To overcome this scenario countries assess both capabilities and intentions of other countries. When deciding whether a neighboring state's military modernization may constitute a threat to their security or not. Misperceptions about military capabilities and intentions can heighten the intensity of security dilemma dynamics and raise military tensions. All started in mid-1990s when China significantly accelerated its military modernization with the backup of its decade long economic growth. China's official military budget has increased by a factor of the double-digit. China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has under gone under a series of structural reforms like promulgating new doctrine for modern warfare, reforming military institutions, personnel development and professionalization, and improving exercise and training standards. It has also developed or acquired a range of new weapons systems that significantly improve its capabilities. These include the acquisition of advanced Russian systems such as SU “27 and SU “35 advanced fighters, S “300 surface-to-air missiles, Soveremenny-class destroyers equipped with advanced anti- ship cruise missiles, and Kilo-class advanced diesel submarines. China has greatly expanded its force of conventionally armed short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. It has begun to deploy second-generation nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) including mobile DF “31 and DF “31A systems and has produced a new Jin (Type 094) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) that will carry a second-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). China has also greatly expanded the mechanization of its conventional forces under the umbrellas of RMA and Information and Communication Technology. Integration of China's military rise especially the Information and Communication Technology1 with Chinese innocuous information system2 and statement of its leaders like "Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership  3 gave rise to perfect case of Security dilemma. Only solution to that is greater transparency about military capabilities and intentions, which can therefore be an important tool in building confidence and reducing unwarranted security concerns. The Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army initially resisted foreign calls for greater military transparency, citing China's military weakness and arguing that transparency benefits stronger countries at the expense of weaker states. However, China gradually began to respond to regional concerns with modest efforts to improve its military transparency. One important step was the release of a white paper on the arms control and disarmament policies in 1995, followed by China's first defense white paper in 1998. Both Asian and Western officials praised these documents as the welcoming steps in the direction of greater transparency. This praise, and the implicit demand for greater transparency, led China to adopt a formalized process of producing new defense white papers every two years. Biannual white papers have not fully addressed foreign concerns about a lack of Chinese military transparency. U.S. Government officials continue to complain that China is not sufficiently transparent about military matters. For its part, China has distinguished between transparency about intentions and transparency about military capabilities, claiming that transparency about intentions is more important and that China is completely transparent about its peaceful intentions. Disputes about the degree of Chinese military transparency have become a regular part of U.S.-China diplomatic and military interactions. Partly in response to these concerns, Congress mandated that the Office of Secretary of Defense produce an annual report on Chinese military power. Chinese officials and military officers typically responded that China's transparency ha