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Limited Representationalism

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Locke agreed with the Naive Representationalism that some of the properties of our sense data resemble properties of matter. However, he believed that not all properties of our sense data resemble properties of matter. Locke believed that our sense data was divided into two categories: Primary qualities and secondary qualities. The primary qualities are qualities that actually exist in matter such as shape, size, solidity, number, and motion. The secondary qualities are qualities that exist only in minds. Such as temperature, color, smell, taste, and tactile feelings. The distinction of these two categories is relevant because the primary qualities indicate that there is a reasonably high probability that matter exist while the secondary category is debatable. In regards to the egocentric problem, which states that one cannot be certain that matter exists, Lockes hypothesis, especially primary versus secondary qualities, offers a conclusion to the problem. One can deduce that an object exists (with high certainty) by examining its primary qualities, while an objects secondary qualities do not prove an objects existence. One can say that an object, based on its solidity does in fact exists in its current state. However, one cannot make this same argument based solely on an objects color. Though not bulletproof, Lockes hypothesis does provide a reasonable philosophy of existence. Contrary Solipsist Hypothesis which states that the world exists only in ones mind, Lockes hypothesis is that matter, in fact, does exists. Though he makes a sound argument against the Solipsist hypothesis, pointing out that one cannot control their own senses, his theory is not bulletproof. Lockes major argument of primary qualities versus secondary qualities is based off of the secondary qualities varying between individuals, while primary qualities do not. If this is true than how would Locke explain two individuals that are sensing qualities from differen

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