This essay presents a brief but comprehensive insight into the changes of the Hungarian foreign policy and tries to provide explanations to the changing requirements. It focuses on Hungary’s European role, because the Euro-Atlantic integration tied down almost all out, and deals with the transitional period in detail, i.e. from the regime change until the NATO and EU accessions (Fitzmaurice, 1998, pp. 178-195 & Visegrad Group, 2014). After a short detour of EU-presidency it highlihts the current aims of Hungarian foreign policy (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 & EU2011, 2014). Finally, contemporary events and possible most beneficial decisions will be examined. Each historical era leaves behind a legacy that influences the imminent period. Hungary, after the WWII, experienced a communist rule that determined the political and social structure of the country for four decades. The tacit agreement between the Soviet-led Kremlin and the Hungarian Communist governments included that as long as the Hungarian leaders fully cooperate, support the Soviet foreign policies, and ensure domestic stability the Soviets will apply a considerably reduced control in Hungarian internal affairs[Bar95]. Therefore, the Hungarian foreign policy was relatively free before 1989. Nonetheless, the country had to form its foreign policy in order to conform to Soviet Union-principles. This realist period in international relations and the historical construction and structure of the Hungarian politics and society have determined the country’s foreign policy behaviour; the era was characterised by anti-imperialist and anti-western political ideologies, economic cooperation inside the CMEA1, and military collaboration within the Warsaw Pact2. Although the bipolar world-system of the Cold War, i.e. the Eastern Bloc vs. the Western World have been uneven in economic performance, but they were rivals in military force that caused constant suspicion and readiness to react. Furthermore, it required a continuous cooperation with other communist members. Nevertheless, the external relations among communist states were not problem-free; for example, because of the consequence of the Treaty of Trianon3, more than three million Hungarians were separated to the annexed ex-Hungarian territories, and the way they were treated by the neighbouring countries (mainly in Romania) has often caused tensions in foreign relations. However, the asphyxiant presence of the Soviet Union suppressed the ethno-national conflicts in some extent, but it did not resolve the underlying tensions[Hely?rz?1]. The situation of the Hungarian minorities is still a cornerstone of the Hungarian foreign policy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to the discontinuing dependency, Hungary quasi had to learn everything from the basics. The country had to remove the barriers of the transition to be successful in westernisation. It was a radical system change: from communism to democracy, and from socialism to liberalism. The state had to create democratic institutions, e.g. Constitutional Court and Presidency, system of checks and balances, the multiparty-system. They had to accept liberal values such as freedom of speech and free press. The judicature, the executive, and the legislature had to be trained to comply to the changed system specifications. Consequently, the structure of economy moved from centralised, politics-led economy to free market economy. In practice, it was a state-building (or rather re-building) project. The former realist behaviour was replaced by liberalism. Significant attitudinal changes took place; cooperation with the western world instead of hostilities, trust instead of suspicion, disarmament instead of armament. It was the period of constructivism. The structural change in domestic politics, one might say, inevitably entailed the change in foreign policy, but not only in events but in the composition of the diplomatic staff as well. Barany & Volgyes point out that the large number of state bureaucracy of the Communist era could not be replaced easily owing to their personal links and expertise[Bar95]. After 1990 in the social mood of Hungary everything was wrong which came from the East, and everything was marvellous that came from West. This affected the employees, nominated by the former Communist government, who worked in delegations too, and they were replaced whith new and inexperienced staff who were loyal to the new liberal democratic government, but they were not experienced in international negotiations. On the one hand it is understandable that the new regime wanted to fulfill the positions with its own members, but the exchange of more than half of the diplomats was unreasonable, especially if it is taken into account that the external apparatus since the 1980â€