In the fight against terrorism there is an inconsistency in the discussion on the effectiveness of military action. On the one hand, some academics (Gray, 1993: 17-23; Cronin, 2006) believe that military force is still necessary and that in its absence other anti-terrorist policies will prove useless. On the other hand, other scholars claim that military action can be counterproductive and has incentives for the radicalisation of terrorist groups (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 337-339). The aim of this essay is to analyse the strategic utility of military force in countering transnational terrorism using Al Qaeda as a case study to shed light on the arguments. In the first part of the essay we will study the causes that lead governments to use military force to tackle terrorism and the limitations that these present. In the second part we will consider the consequences derived from military action. Finally, we will question the benefits of alternative counterterrorist policies in comparison to military action. According to Duyvesteyn (2008), there are six main strategies that Governments follow in order to apply military force to counter terrorism. In the first place, the use of military force can be justified as a method to support government authorities to enforce law and re-establish order. Countries that have been defined as breeding grounds for terrorist cells can experience the militarisation of their territory, as happened with Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the deployment of troops can be used by terrorist groups in favour of their own propaganda, giving evidence of the situation of subordination of the group to the repression undertaken by the powerful ruling classes. In order for the military action not to be delegitimized it is essential that governments identify the specific purposes of terrorist groups so that use of force is recognised not to be gratuitous (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 335). Secondly, during the Bush administration pre-emption was significantly used to tackle terrorist groups through military action. The main problem with this tactic is that it is difficult to draw a clear line between preemptive and preventive use of force and justifying necessity according to a credible and imminent threat is not the best remedy for terrorism. Moreover, military force has been acknowledged as a deterrent upon terrorists (Gordon, 2007: 24). However, it has been argued that deterrence is not effective against transnational terrorist groups, which are characterised by having a decentralised and networked structure that depends more on affiliated groups and connections than on a visible leadership (Hoffman, 2013). As a matter of fact, military action against Libya for its governmental support to Al Qaeda did not deter other countries from offering shelter to the group, which can be seen in the cases of Iran or Syria (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 336). On top of this, military force as a form of reprisal has shown to be counterproductive and solely effective in the short-term. In the case of Iraq and Libya, retaliation had only a temporary effect on Al Qaeda and led to a visible strengthening of the group and the attraction of new adherents to the movement, complicating counterterrorism tasks (Kegley, 2003: 190; Duyvesteyn, 2008: 337). In addition, the killing of the leader is another of the tactics to which military action is functional. Whereas some authors believe that the assassination of the leaders leaves the terrorist