In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks to establish the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative, to act as a standard to which actions can be evaluated for their moral worth. In this paper I will evaluate that principle in greater detail, in addition I will assess them from a perspective contrary to the categorically imperative. Kant believes that actions motivated by personal experience, whether through observation, persuasion or to some other extent, lack moral worth because such actions are not determined by the notion of moral law. When things such as effects, habit, consequence or material objects manipulate the will and thus constitute the foundation for an individual's decision, moral problems ensue. Therefore, according to Kant, morality must be separated from thoughts that develop posteriori, the notion that something can only be known through observation, and that moral action must rely on the unmoving element of pure reason. As pure reason and respect for moral law drives moral action, separating morality from daily human experiences enables individuals to form maxims, things that are universally known and accepted, that cause their actions to be willed into universal law, which Kant believes is necessary to determine the content of moral action. Kant addresses the potential contradictions that can arise from universalizing a maxim, for example a lying promise; when he constructs his categorical imperative, universality is required in the formation of a moral law. As a result, making a false promise goes against the categorical imperative because universalizing false promises would be impossible considering that if everyone broke their promises the establishment of a promise would collapse and no one would believe promises or accept contracts that they knew would be broken. The importance of universal law in determining the moral worth of an action is apparent when making a false promise; for example, a man struggling is in need of money, so he borrows some from his friend who has been saving for a house for his new family. He knows that he cannot repay, but promises to do so anyway. His maxim is "when I am in need of money, I will borrow it and promise to repay it, even though I am sure I cannot repay this money." How would things stand if this were a universal law? This now new “law of false promises” destroys the seriousness of a promise, since no person would believe it anyone. Since this example could in more form be rationalized, it must be deemed immoral. On the contrary, if a man standing in your threshold holding you at gunpoint asks where your wife and children were, the categorical imperative gives you two options. The first would be to tell the truth, since we are obligated not to lie in any