The battle against Communism - or better known as the Vietnam War - was principally directed by four administration, which was that of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Early political and economic decisions made by Eisenhower and his advisory board were primarily based on a theory of ‘territorial domino’, namely the fear of communism spreading across Southeast Asia. As Kennedy and Johnson took over office, the ‘domino’ theory evolved into a ‘psychological’ one, in other words the U.S. was so deeply involved economically and politically in South Vietnam, that the possibility of withdrawing from the war was nearly impossible. Winning the war was now of upmost importance for the U.S because they believed their reputation and prestige as a leading World Nation was at hand. These two contrasting perspectives were the leading factors for policy makers during the war, however their overall goals were similar; they wanted to create an independent South Vietnam with a stable anticommunist government and at the same time militarily deny the National Liberation Front (NLF) of successfully conquering the South and thus leading to a victory for the Communist. By 1963 the Unites States had invested so much time, money, and troops that the Americanization of the war was inevitable. The struggle to implement a stable government in South Vietnam, the election years of 1964, 1968, and 1972, and many other circumstances, prolonged the war by uncountable years. Although it may have been considered moral to Americanized the war, the lack of public support and political decisions made by the U.S. government, such as Vietnamization, leads one to question if the policies on the war made were aimed at benefiting Vietnam or the United States themselves. Initial political and economic decisions made by the Americans were based on a metaphor known as the ‘domino theory’, in other words the U.S feared the consequences of a Communist victory in Vietnam. Eisenhower held strong beliefs that “Indochina was the first in a row of dominoes. If it fell its neighbors would shortly thereafter fall with it, end where did the process end?” After a French defeat in Vietnam, the Geneva Conference was arranged to negotiate terms with North Vietnam and leading world nations, such as Britain and China. Even though the Unites States were not interested in the Conference, they had an alliance with Britain and France and felt obliged to participate and pronounced themselves as mere “observers." However, being a leading military and economic nation, and having supported the French economically during the war, the U.S. felt ‘inclined’ to give their opinion. Eisenhower’s administration used the ‘domino’ metaphor to argue for internalizing the war in Vietnam, but they were the only proponents of the idea. Terms were agreed and established on the grounds of a cease-fire, the return of refugees to the South, a temporary division of forces in Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel, and the promise of elections to determine the future of a unified Vietnam. All these agreements favored the U.S. because a cease-fire meant no war; the division gave the South significant towns, and the elections presented the Americans with a chance to spread their political faith throughout South Vietnam. Well before Geneva the U.S. had begun to work with the future South Vietnamese government, they had fortified their position by helping Ngo Dinh Diem plot against the North and financially supporting his anticommunist government: “Between 1954 and 1959, 1.2 billion dollars in American assistance went to South Vietnam.” Eisenhower even sent one of his advisers, J. Collins, to assist Diem and his government to maintain internal order and foster economic development. He reported back to Washington and told E