The hope for a durable solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict collapsed after ten years of diplomatic efforts and negotiations made by the counterparts. The Oslo Process officially started on September 1993 with the signature of “The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.” It stretched out over an unstable regional environment and had to close the gap between the different interests and necessities of the parties. Furthermore, misunderstandings and mutual suspicions limited the full implementation of the peace obligations contained in the accords. After Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat refused the Israeli proposal at Camp David in July 2000, the academic world started a fierce debate on the causes of the failure. In this paper I will identify the obstacles that hindered the pursuit of a final status and how political divergences and the weak social economic background influenced the collapse of the peace. To expose and understand the problem, I will argue the shift in the Israeli and Palestinian approaches towards peace, using the realistic theory of International Relations. The Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority, whose functions are the limited self-governance over parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The most important issues are the borders of Israel and Palestine, the Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the question of Israel's military presence in and control over the remaining territories after the recognition of the Palestinian autonomy by Israel, and the Palestinian right of return. The Oslo Accords, however, did not create a Palestinian state. When the peace process began, the mutual recognition of existence was seen as a triumph of the liberal approach to peace. Notwithstanding this early proclamation, the development of negotiations embodies many realistic elements, which could be traced back to the base of the parties' divergences on fundamental questions as the right of return for Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements on Palestinian land and the East Jerusalem question. Realism stresses the importance of power politics in order to ensure the most important pivots of a state: internal security and national interests1. Since states hold the core values- survival of the state and the absence of external influences. In high regard, its actions are based on realistic calculations, free of moral or ethic considerations. According to one of the eminent thinkers of realism theory, Kenneth Waltz, it is the structure of the international system that influences political actions, because the international system is anarchic and “life of the state among states” must be protected to safeguard national interests. In a multipolar system the uncertainty increases. The decision maker can misunderstand the actions of the other actor. This Security Dilemma, which finds his roots in a perpetual international state of nature, determines political actions as completely empty of moral justification. According to realism the necessity to build peace talks comes out in a particular moment of the change of the world's and Middle Eastern political assets. The change to the regional balance of power, concerning particular facts that occurred by the end of the 1980s, pushed Israel and the PLO to open dialogue in order to preserve political and social primary factors. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War changes the attitude on international relations of several Middle East states towards the United States who, at the beginning of the 1990s, in order to reaffirm their power in the region, face the collapse of the USSR system and to maintain the control on the oil Gulf, decided to intervene against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, in the first Gulf War in 1991. The precarious situation in the region caused by a shift of the balance of power, was also due to the birth of terrorism and to the rise of the First Intifada on December 1987. The increase of terrorist attacks with a civilian target exacerbated diplomatic relations between the parties and enhanced mutual suspicions. There were two important Palestinian expectations: the first expectation was that the Oslo process would bring to a halt the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli withdrawals were to proceed by a fixed schedule, leading to Palestinian Authority control over more than 90 percent of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, setting the stage for the final Israeli withdrawal all the way to the 1967 borders. The second expectation centered around increased economic development in Palestinian society, bringing the Palestinians out of extreme poverty and reducing the gap in living standards between them and the Israelis that many Palestinians thought humiliating and enraging. In a few words, the Israeli expectations were centered on security. Decades of Palestinian terrorism had led many Israelis to have fear to lose the control in the West